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Views from the North and the South 
on the challenge posed to the EU by 
the untested resilience of the euro in 
weathering the world financial crisis 
and on the need for Europe to have 
a crisis prevention “toolbox” for the 
future; the potential consequences of 
the social dimension of the EU in-
ternal market; and, lastly, how glob-
alisation has brought to the surface 
the need for new political impetus to 
make Europe’s Single Market more 
efficient and socially responsible –
these are the four main issues cov-
ered in April’s BEPA Monthly.
The first lead article by Fernando 
Navarrete Rojas, of FAES, is highly 
topical and looks at how the current 
economic crisis has revealed the 
weak spots of monetary union and 
undermined its very foundations. 
Lessons can therefore be drawn 
from this article, including the need 
for strong political support from 
Europe’s leaders and institutions, a 
consistent and fiscally sound macro-
economic strategy and a more robust 
and rules-based framework across 
Europe.
The second lead article by Daniela 
Schwarzer, of SWP, while praising 
the virtues of the euro in coping 
with the current economic crisis, 
stresses that Europe needs to have a 
sound crisis management toolbox 
and to improve surveillance of mac-
roeconomic imbalances. Ms Schwar-
zer also favours moving towards 
closer market integration and, in the 
long run, creating automatic stabilis-
ers to minimise the adverse and un-
even effects brought about by asym-
metric shocks. Looking at the pros-
pects of reform, she argues that the 
current political conditions are not 
conducive to far-reaching reforms. 
The EMU governance discussion 
needs to be reframed and to intro-
duce more European thinking into 
domestic policy debate.
The third lead article is by Jacques 
Pelkmans and provides useful in-
sights into how to assess the mean-
ing of the social dimension of the 
Single Market today. While acknowl-
edging that the EU has limited pow-
ers on social matters, he argues that 
there is scope for political manoeu-
vre to give social dimension a more 
prominent place in a new internal 
market initiative. This objective 
could be attained, for example, by 
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improving coordination of national employment 
strategies, especially within the context of 
EU2020. 
The fourth lead article by Paola Rossi gives a de-
tailed account of the workshop organised by 
BEPA and Bruegel before the Easter break on 
the new strategy for the Single Market. Although 
this event confirmed that there are no ready-
made recipes for revamping the Single Market, 
participants made it clear that the Single Market 
needs to generate new political momentum and 
to foster closer market integration while at the 
same time encompassing new areas. 
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After the abundance of cheap money and credit 
during boom times, the hard crash with reality has 
finally arrived and the myths of the past are tum-
bling down. The myth that stated that the public 
sector could replace the private sector without ma-
jor consequences has come to an end with the 
eruption of severe fiscal and sovereign debt crisis 
that pose a risk to the whole economy. Pain for the 
past excesses will not and cannot be avoided. We 
can only partially select the timing and who will 
bear the costs. And in any of these transfers of 
costs and responsibility we can only add to the total 
amount of cost to be assumed specially due to the 
long-term consequences of a loss of incentives and 
discipline. 
The euro has brought about a much deeper level of 
interdependence among the different European 
economies than was thought possible back in the 
1990s when its design was discussed. Therefore, 
problems in the public accounts of specific Euro-
pean countries are not only, or even mainly, a prob-
lem involving their respective citizens and political 
leaders anymore, but a problem for banks, taxpay-
ers and their corresponding political leaders else-
where. Also interdependence works in the other 
direction and problems in the financial systems in 
some core countries do pose a problem for others. 
This is the current setting and it is good to have it 
like this. Political decision making has to adapt to all 
this through an explicit rules based system. That is a 
major task ahead that in the latest EU leaders’ sum-
mit was only briefly pointed out.
The European project is indeed in a quandary that 
will shape its future for the next decades to come. 
The main issue that will ultimately shape the econ-
omy, policies, and power balances in the future 
Europe is the response to the fiscal crisis that is 
taking place in several of the euro area countries.
It is important to understand that what should 
really concern European leaders regarding the fiscal 
crisis is not what finally happens with Greece, – as 
important as it is especially for the Greek people –
but what could happen to other countries that do 
pose a real systemic risk for the euro area. In this 
regard, the mechanism devised to alleviate the 
Greek debt crisis is of outmost importance, as it 
will enable us to see which incentives and political 
and economic restrictions other struggling coun-
tries will have to face in order to cope with a fiscal 
crisis that cannot be denied anymore. Short-term 
pain savings may not be worth the long-term con-
sequences of putting again in place bad incentives 
against fiscal discipline for the second time in the 
short history of the euro.
The original (design) structure of the euro, as set 
out in the Treaty of Maastricht, has proved unable 
to respond to these challenges. The entire institu-
tional architecture was based upon fiscal rules (the 
Stability and Growth Pact) precisely designed to 
avoid situations we are in today. This was a Pact 
that was originally intended to preserve a euro that 
exported the monetary and fiscal stability of the 
leading countries to all members of the club. This 
was indeed the strength and the raison d’être of the 
euro: a single and stable currency, not just a com-
mon currency. That was the deal and the aim many 
countries fought hard to achieve and that final ob-
jective should not be opportunistically changed.
The real history of the euro proves how wrong it is 
the idea that postulates that there is a group of 
countries best suited ’genetically’ for responsibility 
and stability, and another group – basically Mediter-
ranean countries – with worse behavioural attitudes 
to stability. Following this myth some argue this 
second group should not be invited to join in and if 
so, tight discipline should be imposed on them at 
whatever cost. Working solutions should be based 
on realities and not on baseless myths. We must 
bear in mind that, after the bursting of the dot.com 
bubble, economic problems spread all across 
Europe. The crisis and unemployment spread 
across those countries more reluctant to reform 
their economies. Certainly, different governments 
were in office in those days. It was not precisely 
Mediterranean countries who first breached and 
1 The restoration of fiscal discipline. A view from Southern 
Europe or a vision for Europe?
By Fernando Navarrete Rojas* 
* Director of economics and public policy at the Foundation for Social Studies and Analysis (FAES) in Madrid.
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then fought fierce to change the rules mid-game, 
thus demonstrating their power within the EU, be-
cause the rules were not convenient in the short 
term. The political message that was sent out to all 
countries of the euro was crystal clear. The seed of 
fiscal irresponsibility had been sown, and once 
grown it had backfired against everyone. 
The result is that we have reached the point we 
were seeking to avoid, and now the response to a 
situation that has been deliberately ignored is some-
what improvised. Fortunately early draft plans that 
ruled out IMF intervention were dismissed. Now 
the challenge is to realise that the damage to the 
Greek economy was made earlier and there is little 
that can be done apart from the tough fiscal deci-
sions that should be taken by Greek national au-
thorities and from following standard procedure 
for public debt laden countries, i.e. providing liquid-
ity support based on strict conditionality monitored 
by a third party. 
To many observers it might surprise how much has 
been written recently on the amount of funds avail-
able if requested by the Greek authorities, how 
much tax payers across Europe will contribute, 
what would trigger the mechanism, the interest 
rates to be applied to the different tranches of loans 
etc. and how little attention has been paid to the 
conditionality that should be attached to the assis-
tance programme. This shows that there is a risk of 
missing the whole point: the challenge for the 
European leaders is how to make credible again the 
Eurozone as a zone of stability. This is incompati-
ble with benevolent myopic decisions. To bring the 
euro back on track is a major political challenge that 
needs much more than therapeutic policy- making. 
The political (and not merely technical) message 
that the euro project we all agreed on is by defini-
tion incompatible with irresponsible and unsustain-
able national fiscal policies should be heard loudly. 
For this to be achieved, European leaders and EU 
institutions should promote the adoption of na-
tional stability agreements among all the political 
parties that in each country will be governing the 
national budgets in the decades to come.
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The economic and financial crisis is the first seri-
ous stress test to the Eurozone and at first sight 
the young currency is navigating through the 
storm surprisingly well. Its unique governance 
set-up has proven sufficiently flexible to handle 
situations unexpected at the time the EMU’s ar-
chitecture was devised. But there is no reason to 
relax: The conditions for finding long-term solu-
tions for the EMU’s apparent governance prob-
lems have deteriorated. 
Adjusting crisis management and prevention 
tools and tackling long-term challenges
The Eurozone has to tackle serious shortcom-
ings of economic and fiscal governance to ensure 
its survival. Currently, the management and pre-
vention of those crises induced by unsustainable 
economic and fiscal policies are the most press-
ing aspects. 
The Eurozone will have to deal with further 
budgetary crises and possibly with sovereign de-
faults. To date, it does not dispose of proper cri-
sis management instruments. The Greek case is be-
ing handled on an ad hoc basis. This ad-hocery 
should not be repeated – and not only because 
the overt political disputes over the issue have 
had negative repercussions for the Euro’s image 
in the world and on public opinion within the 
Union. Upcoming cases may also be too large to 
be handled in a comparable way and market re-
actions may be more violent. A general crisis 
resolution mechanism should include a Euro-
pean Monetary Fund along with clear rules for 
conditionality and transparent procedures to 
handle a sovereign default to increase predict-
ability. 
With regard to crisis prevention, it is increasingly 
acknowledged that budgetary discipline is insuffi-
cient to prevent instability. The next fiscally 
problematic country cases following on Greece 
are likely to be those which result from competi-
tiveness problems (such as Spain). The EMU 
thus not only needs a framework which can pre-
vent fiscal misbehavior and misreporting. It also 
has to reduce the economic imbalances that may 
cause more serious economic and political ten-
sions. This implies stronger surveillance of real 
exchange rates and their underlying variables 
such as wage and price developments, taxation 
policies etc.
Correcting imbalances may also be a necessary 
part of the solution to the problems of some 
highly indebted countries. Fiscal consolidation 
and real exchange rate adjustment pursued for 
instance by the Greek government may not be 
sufficient if the country runs into a vicious circle 
of recession and pro-cyclical consolidation poli-
cies. In that case, the country may need to be 
helped through an adjustment on the part of the 
“current account surplus” countries or via higher 
fiscal transfers over a longer period. 
In order to tackle persistent divergence within its 
borders in the long run, the Eurozone should 
pursue a three-fold strategy: Firstly, market inte-
gration should be pushed in order to better ac-
commodate asymmetric shocks. Secondly, with 
regard to the future EU budget, EU money is 
not spent in a way that unleashes pro-cyclical 
effects, but rather the contrary: ways should be 
found to extend EU spending over the cycle or 
to vary co-financing. Thirdly, the question 
whether the Eurozone would fare better in good 
and bad times with automatic stabilisers on the 
EMU level should be thoroughly debated.
Another crisis driving further integration?
Since the crisis broke out, economic governance 
mechanisms in the EMU have undergone impor-
tant dynamics. Some policy watchers have identi-
fied big leaps in European integration thanks to 
the crisis. Among the examples commonly cited 
is the first Eurozone summit of October 2008 or 
the legislative package on Financial Market Su-
pervision (which admittedly does not meet the 
2 The need to reframe the governance debate in the Eurozone
By Daniela Schwarzer*
* Dr. Daniela Schwarzer is Head of the EU-integration division at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), the German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs. She was previously editorialist and France correspondent of the Financial Times 
Deutschland.
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expectations of those who argue for even 
stronger European supervision). Another exam-
ple is the new willingness to apply existing policy 
coordination mechanisms more rigorously. Both 
are examples that indeed the European level is 
strengthened in surveillance and in policy coordi-
nation. 
But there is little reason to assume that the cur-
rent crisis – like other crises in the past decades –
catalyses a big leap forward. One could even ar-
gue that the conditions for cooperative political 
behaviour on the side of the member states have 
deteriorated. This explains the difficulties coun-
tering the challenges outlined above.
Sensitive public opinion
Historical data on public opinion shows that 
support for European integration is low when 
the economic situation is bad (low growth, high 
unemployment, individuals feel of economic and 
social insecurity correlate with little support for 
integration). And since the real economic effects 
have hit the EU member states in 2009, there is 
indeed some evidence of declining support for 
integration. 
But on the other hand, there are rising public 
expectations as regards the EU’s problem-
solving and protective capacity in the economic 
and social dimensions. This tendency is likely to 
rise with new generations becoming voters who 
have grown up in a Euro-reality, without per-
sonal memories of the age of national currencies. 
Nevertheless, high expectations not only mean 
potential backing for joint European initiatives, 
but also greater potential for public disappoint-
ment. Failed expectations could result in an even 
stronger decline in support for the EU. The im-
portance of active communication and opinion 
leadership on the benefits of the EU and the 
Euro is hence rising.
Little opinion leadership on EU issues 
to be expected
For some time now, observers deplore growing 
EU indifference or skepticism and the lack of 
political leadership. The domestic political con-
text at least in some member states may rather 
deteriorate than improve in the near future. The 
effects of the crisis, the adaptation to rising com-
petitive pressure and need for real devaluation 
may cause political backlash. Political fragmenta-
tion and rising populism may weaken some gov-
ernments’ appetite for integration. 
Since the 1990s, member states look at the net 
costs and benefits of EU membership more 
closely. In the long run, there is the risk that net 
payers revise previous assumptions on necessary 
solidarity and cohesion in the E(M)U to the bot-
tom. Policy choices are assessed with predomi-
nantly short-term considerations with less of a 
historical perspective on the challenges. Among 
the reasons for this is the change of generations 
among political leaders and the fact that external 
challenges (which of course do exist but which 
tend to be largely underestimated) exert little in-
tegrative pressure, compared to the Cold War. 
Questions about changes in European engage-
ment are raised in particular with regard to Ger-
many, not least with regard to the recent ruling 
of the German Constitutional Court and more 
recently Germany’s debate and position on 
Greece.
Germany and the economic governance 
debate
In particular, the German EMU governance de-
bate seems somewhat out of phase with discus-
sions on the Eurozone that develop in Brussels, 
in European and international academic/think 
tank circles or in European and international me-
dia. The interpretation of the Eurogroup state-
ment of March 15, 2010 illustrates one of the 
aspects. It prominently mentions external imbal-
ances (and not only current account deficits) as a 
problem acknowledging that imbalances should 
be tackled both by deficit and surplus countries. 
Meanwhile, the interpretation in Berlin is still 
widely that adaptation is the deficit countries’ 
duty.
The debate on Greece (and the idea that 
“Germany could pay most of the share”) has 
touched the nerves of the population, media and 
the government. The criticism of Germany’s ex-
port strength (which has replaced the D-Mark as 
the strongest symbol of national identity) and the 
reproach that Germany is “free-riding” on others 
has provoked profound feelings of unfairness. 
Mistrust towards fellow Eurozone members has 
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risen, there are profound concerns that the sta-
bility orientation of the EMU is at danger, which 
revives deeply rooted German fears about the 
devastating consequences of monetary and eco-
nomic instability the country experiences in the 
first half of the 20th century.
With regard to the question of sharing the costs 
of adaptation in the current crisis, at least part of 
the German press has a tendency to ridicule dis-
cussions on the question whether Germany 
needs to adapt its growth model. The majority of 
statements and press articles transport the idea 
that the German way is the only feasible one, 
that there is in any case no way to influence do-
mestic demand and there is little mentioning of 
the question whether the German strategy would 
at all be sustainable if the other Eurozone mem-
ber states indeed followed. 
The way the debate on Greece has evolved in 
Germany has probably lead to ideological hard-
ening of positions and perceptions. This is part 
of the reasons why Germany will most likely 
continue to be very reluctant on further govern-
ance debates. The question of “fair share” will 
probably arise when the question of fiscal exit is 
discussed as some observers start making the 
case that Germany should withdraw fiscal stimu-
lus later than national conditions would suggest 
in order to support Eurozone-wide recovery. 
A need to reframe the issue
The EU currently faces a window of opportunity 
to bring forward the governance debate, as the 
crisis management period and the “case of 
Greece” correlate with the EU2020 and EU 
budget debate. But so far, the political focus is 
on risk management and prevention, but not on 
the strategic question how to develop the Euro-
zone further and to improve its performance. In 
order to open up the discussions, the current 
debate should be reframed by consciously giving 
European impulses in national debates. Some 
elements could be:
Eurozone problems need Eurozone answers: There is a 
need to explain more clearly that in many ways 
domestic economic (and in the end social condi-
tions) cannot be seriously tackled without 
stronger coordination in the Eurozone. This is 
more than crisis prevention and management, 
there is a need for a coherent and growth en-
hancing policy mix. 
Eurozone problems need strong Eurozone actors: The 
crisis has made clear that the Eurozone has par-
ticular coordination requirements. It needs ef-
forts of confidence building among its leaders 
and a strategic debate on its own development. 
While the increased interest of the European 
Council in EU economic matters is positive, 
closer political exchange among the EMU-16 
should be pursued in parallel. EU members 
which are not (yet) part of the Eurozone should 
be informed, but should not be the reason not to 
deal with EMU issues among EMU members.
The dynamics outside the Eurozone should not be ne-
glected: Closer and continuous political exchange 
in the Eurozone is all the more important as it 
will have to react to global dynamics (such as e.g. 
the rebalancing of the US-China relationship). 
The rapidly changing international environment 
(in political, economic, security and demographic 
terms) and its consequences for Europe should 
be highlighted to enable more realistic assess-
ments of what single member states would be 
able to achieve on their own. 
Eurozone citizens have to be taken along: A perma-
nent issue in the governance debate is the dis-
crepancy between national sovereignty and the 
economic interdependencies within the Euro-
zone. Governments stick to national approaches 
at the cost of potentially suboptimal political and 
economic outcomes – even if joint approaches 
would be a win-win-situation for all. In a short 
view, this is neither irrational nor illegitimate 
given their national constituencies. In the long 
run, this problem can only truly be overcome by 
a quantum lead in integration: a democratisation 
of Euro-level economic governance.
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In two weeks time, Professor Mario Monti is ex-
pected to present his suggestions for a revival of 
the Single Market to Commission President Bar-
roso. In his entrusting letter to Monti, Barroso 
rightly points to “…the dramatic consequences 
that would derive from undermining the Single 
Market. That would erode the basis for eco-
nomic integration and growth and employment 
throughout the EU…” [See PRES(2009) 
D/2250 ]. After rehearsing the oft-heard refrain 
that the Single Market is far from being com-
pletely in place and the Commission’s intention 
to “… take a more systematic and integrated ap-
proach…”, he notes that the financial crisis in-
duced “… some critical reconsideration of the 
functioning of markets” as well as “… enhanced 
concerns about the social dimension.” Given 
that the Lisbon Treaty says that “… the Union 
[…] shall work […] for a highly competitive so-
cial market economy…”, the Commission Presi-
dent calls for a fresh look “at how the market 
and the social dimensions of an integrated Euro-
pean economy can be mutually strengthened”. 
Indeed, in the preparatory discussions to support 
Monti’s reflections, many observers referred to 
the negative or sceptical perceptions currently 
held in Europe about “more market”, including 
“more internal market”. Some analysts think that 
the ’neo-liberal paradigm’ has been discredited; 
others note that numerous citizens and workers 
have lost confidence in the authorities’ ability to 
properly regulate and supervise financial markets 
and the leading actors in the markets – with pro-
foundly negative repercussions for all – and yet 
others find that public money is being spent on 
banks and far less on mitigating the social conse-
quences that have befallen those who had noth-
ing to do with the cause. One inference of these 
deliberations is to place the ’social dimension 
upfront’ when reviving the Single Market.
The social dimension of the internal market has 
been a theme for debate ever since 1987, when 
Jacques Delors introduced it as a counterbalance 
to the emerging “Europhoria” of European busi-
ness about the EC-1992 Single Market pro-
gramme. Although the complaints about the lack 
of a “Social Europe” make it into the local and 
European press much more easily than a sober 
analysis of the actual meaning of the label and 
the factual progress made, this CEPS Commen-
tary encourages the reader to step back for a mo-
ment and reflect on what “the” social dimension 
of the Single Market does and does not mean 
and to assess where we stand today. Only then, it 
seems to me, is it possible to draw some infer-
ences about the potential and scope of “putting 
the social dimension upfront” in a new internal 
market initiative.
Social dimension at the EU level?
The biggest initial fear was that the internal mar-
ket’s deepening and widening would engender a 
Thatcherite wave of deregulation across the 
EU12. In the Hannover European Council of 
1988, this fear was dispelled by announcing high 
standards of social protection for the EU, a 
phrase later incorporated in the Maastricht 
Treaty. Of course, those standards were not set 
at the EU level since Member States were very 
reluctant to transfer significant social powers to 
the EU. So, it was up to the Member States. 
However, whenever the EU did have the compe-
tences, such a high level of protection had to be 
pursued at EU level. Similarly, the internal mar-
ket should not undermine such standards and 
where a problem might arise, minimum har-
monisation would guarantee a “floor” of social 
protection. The Social Protocol was attached to 
the Maastricht Treaty in a legally complex fash-
ion owing to the fact that the UK government 
was unwilling to ratify. This suggested that the 
Protocol was socially ambitious (which it defi-
nitely was not) and that Member States other 
than the UK were significantly less sensitive to a 
further delegation of social powers to the EU 
level (which was not the case either). In 1997 the 
Labour government wasted no time in formally 
accepting the Protocol. During the 1990s and to 
some extent in more recent years, a series of 
3 How social the Single Market?
By Jacques Pelkmans*
* Jacques Pelkmans is Senior Fellow at CEPS and Jan Tinbergen Chair at the College of Europe, where he directs the Economic 
Studies Department.
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minimum social requirements have been incor-
porated into EU directives.1 The Social Dialogue, 
also introduced in Maastricht, has been used by 
the social partners to jointly formulate the texts 
of some of these directives2 as well as a large 
number of specialised sectoral agreements. Thus, 
even though Member States are loathe to trans-
fer social competences to the EU level, increas-
ing market integration has been accompanied by 
a considerable EU effort ensuring that the Single 
Market was not derailed into becoming an anti-
social project. Merely asserting that “the” social 
dimension of the Single Market has been ne-
glected at the EU level seems to be more an ex-
pression of a political preference than a factual 
observation. Lest it be forgotten, the same Mem-
ber States do not allow for an expansion of the 
EU budget, say, to engineer an EU-tier of com-
plementary social spending e.g. on unemploy-
ment benefits.3 Understandably, perhaps, be-
cause such or much other social spending would 
probably not pass a subsidiarity test and the 
amounts would have to be quite large before be-
coming meaningful. But the sole reliance on 
regulatory approaches severely constrains the EU 
level in what it can and cannot do. Within the 
regulatory perspective, in turn, Member States 
are not keen on a serious expansion of EU pow-
ers.
The social dimension after the Eastern 
enlargement
When the two Eastern enlargements arrived, so-
cial anxieties increased in the high-income part 
of the EU. It is useful to remember that host 
country control (HCC) had been “acquis” since 
the early 1970s (and still is). Labour unions typi-
cally regarded this as a form of (national) social 
protection, allowing them to accept the free 
movement of workers (formally, though not 
practically, in place since 1968). HCC ensures 
that workers migrating to another EU country 
cannot compete on the essentials of labour mar-
ket regulation in the destination country, whether 
minimum wages, holidays, working time or 
(most) other aspects. It is a convenient rule 
among countries with more or less similar in-
come levels: given the complexity of labour law 
and its manifold links with the local welfare state, 
clarity about which country’s law applies is help-
ful. With Eastern enlargements, however, in-
come levels suddenly were drastically different. 
The upshot is an awful dilemma between HCC 
in high-income EU countries and ensuring in 
reality the rights of workers from the new Mem-
ber States. Workers in high-income EU countries 
tend to stick to HCC, as before, but nonetheless 
find that somehow Eastern workers flock to 
’their’ labour markets, in particular in segments 
like construction, horticulture, cleaning, simple 
restaurants and meat processing. What is the EU 
element of this predicament (and what is not)? 
What is not so ’social’ about this manifestation 
of the internal market, giving the latter a bad 
reputation?
Economically, a strict adherence to HCC has the 
effect of reducing or eliminating the demand for 
Eastern workers in the high-income EU coun-
tries.4 This is so irrespective of whether they 
come as migrants taking up a regular job or as 
posted workers for temporary services. The only 
scope for those workers to be hired is 1) the dif-
ferential between the minimum wage and the 
wages actually paid and 2) a willingness to work 
longer hours and on Saturdays since they are 
away from home in any event. Apart from this 
limited scope, HCC is therefore protectionist: it 
keeps Eastern workers out; worse, they cannot 
exploit their social rights (of free movement) un-
der the treaty, namely, the income-raising oppor-
tunity of working in the Single Market where the 
well-paid jobs are. Thus, what is “social” for 
high-income workers, is “asocial” for Eastern 
workers and they are the poor lot. It is simply 
incorrect to argue that high-income countries –
in imposing HCC on Eastern workers interested 
to come to their labour market – are exercising a 
benign form of “social protection” on their be-
half.5 The contrary is correct: HCC ensures that 
the effective demand for those workers dries up 
so that there will be nobody from poor EU 
countries to protect in the first place. HCC robs 
free movement of workers (or free movement to 
provide temporary services) from relatively poor 
EU countries of its socio-economic meaning. 
The European Court of Justice (and the Celle 
court in Germany, having requested a prelimi-
nary ruling) spotted this correctly in the 2008 
Ruefert case.6
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The Polish plumber who never was
A closely related social anxiety was the French 
myth about the Polish plumber. Proof that the 
Polish plumber in France never really existed –
indeed, could not exist – is disarmingly simple. 
There was no basis for accusations of “the” EU, 
neither in the EU ’constitution’ nor in the acquis 
at the time (nor today). One wonders who has 
talked the French press and citizens into this and 
why the elementary unravelling of the story 
never had a chance. There are four options for 
the notion of the Polish plumber and four is ex-
haustive:
i) The plumber may get into France (or many 
other EU countries) as a normal migrant, taking 
up a regular job; this labour contract is under 
HCC (and already was, decades ago); this applies 
equally when the plumber would work for an 
employment agency.
ii) The plumber may come as a posted worker 
for a temporary (plumbing) job; as noted above, 
posted workers fall under HCC (Dir. 96/71), 
irrespective of whether the firm posting him is 
established in Poland or e.g. in France.7
iii) The plumber may come to France (or else-
where in the EU) as an independent-without-
personnel (IWP); here, matters are different be-
cause our plumber can now enter into a service 
contract for a total work project (say, doing the 
plumbing of a school building) for a fixed 
amount; the implicit hourly wage of that contract 
can be below the HCC wage since he is an inde-
pendent (with all the risks that this entails). This 
option is not new at all, however, and has noth-
ing to do with a new twist in the Single Market 
or with enlargement as such. Note that most 
such independents only operate domestically. At 
issue here are those who make most of their liv-
ing from contracts in other Member States. What 
explains the recent increase of the use8 of this 
option is that Eastern workers are more risk-
prone than their counterparts in the EU15, given 
the enormous opportunities for skilled construc-
tion workers in the west of the Union (today, 
after the crisis, they might reconsider, but that is 
another matter). Cross-border IWP services were 
not frequently supplied before, simply because 
the sacrifices of this option, with the service pro-
viders away for many weeks from home time and 
again, are such that few people would wish to do 
this for a long time.
iv) Our plumber might get into France illegally, 
that is, work illegally under contracts or arrange-
ments that infringe French law (and EU law as 
well). The EU cannot be accused because people 
misbehave (given wage discrepancies) and it is up 
to local enforcement to stop it.
It follows that the Polish plumber cannot sym-
bolise a lack of the social dimension of the inter-
nal market: options i and ii are ’social’ in the 
sense of protecting French social entitlements; 
option iii allows selective competition outside 
HCC but it has been around for decades (with 
no ripple effects whatsoever, and balanced by 
much higher risks for those independents) and 
option iv is simply a violation of EU and na-
tional rules (and France itself ought to stop that).
Balking at Bolkestein’s draft?
Could the turbulent debate around the horizon-
tal services directive have left a lingering idea of 
a too weak social dimension? The obsessive de-
bate (often actually a non-debate) in the EP on 
the draft directive made it impossible to pay 
proper attention to very sensible solutions to the 
problem, which were surely social, too. One 
great contribution by the Dutch Socio-Economic 
Council9 was not taken up, much to the peril of 
the EP and the EU. In a most careful and ex-
tremely detailed report, the Council not only ex-
plains in a painstaking fashion all the misunder-
standings and false soundings around the draft 
directive but also adopts a limited list of amend-
ments that enabled the text to remain based on 
the country-of-origin principle, with more dero-
gations (but not as many as the EP allowed due 
to lobbying) and circumscribing some boundary 
issues (like private law questions under the Rome 
Conventions). The report, in fact almost a ready 
text for adoption, was approved unanimously by 
the social partners and the independent experts. 
One cannot seriously argue that the Dutch 
Socio-Economic Council, with the active partici-
pation of labour union leaders and a 60-year so-
cial record envied by many elsewhere, does not 
pay due attention to the social dimension.
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Is the Single Market an agent 
of globalisation?
Could the impact of globalisation on a very open 
EU market for manufactured goods be the ulti-
mate culprit? Because it is so open, so the story 
goes, the single goods market boils down to di-
rect competition with China; hence, the incessant 
pressure to cut non-wage labour costs (mainly, 
social charges) and to invest in China itself. It is 
argued that both trends would, in the long run, 
threaten the viability of Europe’s social models, 
possibly even the EU’s prosperity levels.10 Of 
course, this is a very one-sided picture (and only 
for goods, not to forget), ignoring the fact that 
international economic intercourse is a win-win 
game. So far, the EU problem is one of restruc-
turing, adjustment and shifts to new economic 
activities and this has worked reasonably well, in 
part also because Central and Eastern Europe 
has served as an alternative to remain competi-
tive in certain industries. Indeed, to the rest of 
the world, it is often the EU that is regarded as a, 
if not the, leader in globalisation (certainly in ser-
vices and direct investment, besides capital, inter-
mediate and high quality goods). For the EU to 
continue this relatively successful shift so far, it 
needs to be far more aggressive in innovation 
and change, beginning inside its internal market. 
Nobody in Europe seriously pleads for the Sin-
gle Market to be closed. Other options are all 
related to innovation and adjustment, the more 
so as ageing can be a menace to our future pro-
ductivity growth for another two decades. Since 
services represent 70% of value added, competi-
tion and dynamism in this sector – non-tradable 
“domestic” services just as much as potentially 
tradable services in the internal market – must be 
central to any long-run growth strategy.
Putting the social dimension of the Single 
Market upfront?
In the light of this quick overview, one should 
reflect on what putting the social dimension of 
the internal market upfront would actually mean. 
As shown, the Single Market already has built in 
a social “floor”, as it were. Eastern enlargement 
has increased sensitivities, no doubt, but it has 
also demonstrated the ugly side of HCC: it all 
depends on whether one focuses on “rich” or 
“poor” EU workers. Still, with catch-up growth 
returning soon in Central Europe, this problem 
will gradually go away in another decade.
Perhaps putting the social dimension upfront 
means that in 2012 (when the services Directive 
2006/123 has to be reviewed), the Socio-
Economic Council proposal should be taken up 
again as an improvement over today’s badly 
drafted and unclear directive, with too many 
derogations.
Or perhaps it means that the EU should go for 
growth and jobs even more than before so as to 
pull workers back into jobs. There has been firm 
talk by ministers of a European Employment 
summit and an employment strategy in the 
framework of EU2020. With so many unem-
ployed in the EU, this is indeed an initiative one 
can start with. No doubt, the social and eco-
nomic gain of lowering unemployment in 
Europe renders it an overriding priority. Who 
would possibly oppose it? But is this tantamount 
to the social dimension of the Single Market, or 
is it once again a coordination of basically na-
tional strategies and few if any concrete Single 
Market tools?
Or perhaps it means that the internal market 
cannot be deepened where social sensitivities are 
expected to pop up. Knowing that such sensitivi-
ties persist mainly in labour migration and in ser-
vices, such prudence would pre-empt any move 
to bring genuine productivity improvements 
(except the long-awaited EU patent). It would 
force Professor Monti into side shows such as 
education (crucial, true, but the EU has few 
powers here) or into rehearsing the crucial role 
of domestic reforms (sadly, also these are in ser-
vices and labour markets) where the EU can 
mainly act by persuasion and this has not been 
successful so far in some crucial eurozone coun-
tries. But Barroso has already noted that there is 
still a range of stubborn barriers to migration 
inside the Single Market in matters such as health 
insurance, mutual recognition of diplomas, pen-
sions, housing (for workers with lower wages) 
and occasional tax conflicts between Member 
States.
Or perhaps advocates of putting the social di-
mension upfront refer to accompanying meas-
ures which, in and by themselves, are not part 
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and parcel of the Single Market, such as typical 
Lisbon/EU2020-type goals of fostering social 
inclusion (they are typically local, too), pursuing 
“flexicurity” in national labour markets, improv-
ing active labour policies and emphasising 
“upskilling” the European workforce much 
more than before. All of these are in principle 
worth pursuing (and presumably overlap with 
employment strategies), but not all of them fall 
into the Single Market domain (large as it is) and 
the EU level has no direct powers and just tiny 
funds at best to deliver.
Finally, perhaps one has to go against the per-
ception that “the” Single Market is there for 
(big?) European business. Of course, that is not 
and should not be the philosophy: it is overall 
economic welfare that increases over time, and in 
specific terms, it is the citizens, workers and con-
sumers, who benefit. However, it has been next 
to impossible to convey this message convinc-
ingly to EU consumers and citizens for many 
technically complicated measures over many 
years, still apart from the robustness of the em-
pirical economic analysis. If and when one does 
try to convey these complicated measures, it 
quickly becomes an abstract and conceptual ex-
ercise, with the fall-back option consisting of 
anecdotes. The fact remains that it is predomi-
nantly the relatively big and successful firms that 
actively exploit the Single Market;11 whether we 
like it or not, they are the effective agents making 
the Single Market work. The recent progress on 
facilitating SMEs operating in the internal market 
(with the measures in the Small Business Act, by 
lowering thresholds and cutting red tape) is wel-
come and can only help. We need them. A re-
newed emphasis on consumers and citizens in 
the internal agenda deserves strong support 
(Malcolm Harbour, Chair of the EP Internal 
Market and Consumers Committee, has stressed 
this recently, too), but this can hardly be denoted 
as “putting the social dimension upfront”. Con-
sumers and citizens simply are agents benefiting 
from greater choice and wider options from 
cross-border competition, hopefully also (more) 
on-line, and from price discipline exercised by 
intra-EU competition.
Conclusion
Unlike more than two decades ago, today’s social 
dimension of the internal market has created a 
robust social minimum “floor” of requirements. 
Surely, one might wish to add some such mini-
mum harmonisation in a few areas or make them 
a little more ambitious when revising directives. 
Broadly speaking, however, the Member States 
want the EU level to be responsible for the cur-
rent social dimension of the Single Market… and 
no more. The social powers of the EU are lim-
ited,12 which is exactly what the Member States 
want. It is therefore misleading as well as point-
less to accuse the EU as such of not doing 
enough in areas in which it has no competence 
to deliver. In the context of EU2020 or other-
wise, it is useful to stimulate Member States to 
reform more at home and to coordinate their 
national employment strategies, but this is largely 
independent of further internal market initiatives. 
Of course, one can bring them together in a 
wider “strategy”. After all, both are eminently 
sensible. If this is what is meant by “putting the 
social dimension upfront” in a new internal mar-
ket initiative, I would be all in favour.
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Endnotes
1 Without being exhaustive, they concern health 
and safety at the work place, information and 
consultation of workers (e.g. on major invest-
ments and mergers), collective redundancies, 
avoiding nightshifts, etc. for pregnant women, 
maternity leave, working time (with a host of 
exceptions for special reasons), posted workers, 
the European Work Councils for large European 
companies and directives on part-time and fixed-
time contracts. Later examples include, among 
others, a directive on temporary agency work 
and on protection of workers in the event of in-
solvency of employers. Also, several of these di-
rectives have meanwhile been strengthened.
2 Based on Art. 139, EC, now Art. 155, TFEU.
3 The relatively small EU Social Fund and the 
tiny European Globalisation Adjustment Fund 
have found their place within today’s political 
EU budget cap of 1% of EU GNP. Ideas about 
a complementary EU employment fund go back 
to the 1975 Marjolin report.
4 For a formal economic analysis, see Pelkmans 
(2006, pp. 197-198).
5 Note that the fine sounding slogan “same 
workers, same site, same labour conditions” may 
have similarly perverse effects of locking out 
Eastern workers.
6 Case C-346 / 06, ruling 3 April 2008. The ECJ 
sided with the Celle court which said that com-
plying with local collective agreements would 
make them “… lose the competitive advantage 
which they enjoy…” Similarly, the same obliga-
tion does not lead to ’equal treatment’ with Ger-
man workers either “… but rather prevents 
[posted] workers … from being employed in 
Germany”.
7 Incidentally, since France has general minimum 
wage legislation, unlike e.g. Germany, one would 
expect the inflow of posted workers to be far 
stronger in Germany than in France. This is 
borne out by the data. In the 2008 “Employment 
in Europe” report of DG Employment, Chart 5, 
p. 121, it is shown that more than 80% of posted 
workers in 2006 in Germany were from the new 
EU Member States, as against only one-fifth in 
France.
8 In fact, going beyond anecdotes, we know pre-
cious little about cross-border services provided 
by IWPs. According to the European Founda-
tion for the Improvement of Living and Work-
ing Conditions (2009), one recently observes 
both trends of declining IWPs in some Member 
States and of an increase in other ones e.g. Bel-
gium, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Roma-
nia, and the UK. However, in France in 2007, 
this increase had merely led to a share of 5.8% of 
total employment for IWPs, when including agri-
culture, and around 4 % without. Apart from 
Luxembourg and Denmark, France still has the 
lowest share of all EU countries. The Polish 
share is fairly high (15%), but shares in Italy, 
Portugal, Greece and Romania are higher still. 
What these data do not show is where exactly 
the services of the IWPs are delivered, home or 
abroad and to what extent.
9 SER, 2005.
10 Arguably the sharpest reminder of this fear is 
the title of a famous article in 1995 by Professor 
Richard Freeman, “Are your wages set in Bei-
jing?”. See also Brenton & Pelkmans (1999) for 
extensive analysis of the issues in Europe.
11 For revealing results, based on research with 
data at the individual firm level, see Mayer & Ot-
taviano (2007).
12 For an accessible and brief survey of those pow-
ers and their limits, see Pelkmans (2006, chapter 15) 
or Pelkmans (2008). Note that the Convention in 
February 2003 in working group 11 decided that 
the social powers of the EU were just about right.
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On March 30 2010 BEPA organised, in close 
cooperation with Bruegel, a Workshop on the 
theme “Towards economic union: a new strategy 
for the Single Market”.
The rationale behind this Workshop lies in Presi-
dent Barroso’s conviction that the Single Market 
calls for renewed political commitment to with-
stand the insidious threat of economic national-
ism and tap into its full potential, as set out in 
the political guidelines the President proposed 
for the new Commission. 
We are now approaching the 20th anniversary of 
the symbolic date of 1992, which marked the 
birth of the Single Market. At the time, the re-
nowned Cecchini report entitled the “Costs of 
non-Europe (1988)” specified the conditions for 
establishing the fourth freedoms (goods, capitals, 
services and works) by carefully examining the 
costs and benefits of a Single Market in Europe, 
in accordance with the – at the time – Treaty of 
Rome. That strategic decision, along with the 
integration efforts made by the Delors Commis-
sion, has now a second blush of youth. 
President Barroso clearly stated that one of the 
objectives of the Commission action in the com-
ing years will be to “regain the momentum in the 
internal market, making it the powerhouse of the 
European economy”. The Single Market is “the 
jewel in the EU’s crown”, the backbone of the 
European economy and must be the cornerstone 
of Europe’s recovery. 
To this end, last October President Barroso in-
vited Mario Monti, President of the Bocconi 
University and former Commissioner for Inter-
nal Market, Financial Services and Tax Policy 
(1995-1999) and for Competition (1999-2004) to 
draw up a report on the re-launch of the Single 
Market. To perform this delicate duty, Mr Monti 
liaises directly with the President and avails him-
self of the expertise and logistical support of 
Commission staff. Mr Monti has already con-
sulted Member States, Commissioners, Members 
of the European Parliament and other stake-
holders.
Before completing his report, which is due by 
the end of April, Mr Monti asked BEPA and 
Bruegel to organise the above-mentioned Work-
shop, which provided a unique forum to ex-
change ideas with the academic community and 
with the most relevant think tanks engaged in 
European matters. The main objectives of this 
gathering were to obtain additional information 
and broaden the audience of his consultation 
exercise and to test his ideas and get high-quality 
inputs.
The Workshop has been divided into two ses-
sions, as the revamping of a well-performing and 
efficient Single Market needs both regulatory and 
non-regulatory measures. This combination of 
measures will help markets move towards closer 
integration and, at the same time, it will make 
this further integration politically rewarding and 
socially acceptable. 
After having briefly outlined the progress in the 
Single Market report, Mr Monti brought to the 
table some key questions in order to encourage 
the discussion (e.g. which are the new engines of 
the political and economic integration? Will the 
new Member States take up the flag and become 
the driver of the market reform? What will be 
the role of the old Member States in this respect? 
The first session – “The political economy of the 
Single Market today” – looked at the obstacles 
that continue to remain and at the best way to 
overcome them. Under the helpful guidance of 
Marco Buti, Director-General of DG ECFIN, 
Paul Seabright (Professor and Researcher at the 
“Institut d’Economie Industrielle” of the Tou-
louse University), Helen Wallace (Professor on 
European Integration at the LSE) and Roger 
Liddle (Chair of Policy Network think tank) put 
forward a strategy to be followed and areas in 
which the Commission should act in the years to 
come. What it clearly emerged was the need to 
generate a new political momentum to make the 
Single Market engine work again at full speed. 
Some keynote speakers contented that existing 
differences in “appetite” between old and new 
Member States could create a favourable level 
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playing field for establishing an economic gov-
ernance in Europe. 
The discussion also focussed on other areas, in-
cluding education, health, environment and digi-
tal economy, where certain speakers felt that the 
Commission should become more active. More 
specifically, Professor Wallace emphasised the 
need for the Commission to improve regulation 
and to pay careful attention to health services, e-
industry, green technologies and energy. Roger 
Liddle mentioned tax coordination and the need 
for a re-regulation of financial services at EU 
level, especially in the current crisis framework. 
The second session was chaired by Robert Ver-
rue, Director-General of DG EMPL. Nicolas 
Jabko, Senior Research Fellow at the Faculty of 
Political Sciences, Paris, Daniel Daianu, Profes-
sor of Economics at the National School of Po-
litical and Administrative Studies in Bucharest, 
former Minister of Finance and MEP, and André 
Sapir, Senior Fellow at Bruegel and Professor of 
Economics at the ULB, Brussels took part in this 
session. It was argued by some that the comple-
tion of the Single Market could only be achieved 
at the expense of the welfare and social dimen-
sion, and this perception had become even more 
deep-rooted as a result the world economic cri-
sis. Nicolas Jabko presented his view of the 
“Janus faced Europe”, between liberalism on 
one side and solidarity on the other. He under-
lined the importance of the so-called political 
space for the Single Market, which had recently 
shrunk. In order to “re-launch” the Single Mar-
ket, Mr Jabko suggested to put the social dimen-
sion upfront, re-engineer the Single Market and 
involve more politicians and citizens in this im-
portant project. Little was said, however, on how 
these objectives could be attained.
Mr Daianu insisted that moral/ethical values 
should be more present in the business dimen-
sion and that taming financial markets (via better 
regulation and supervision) would unleash more 
entrepreneurship and dynamism.
Mr Sapir framed the Single Market within the 
context of the global Europe, underlying the ten-
sion between equity and efficiency in the Market 
and suggesting that Europe should invest more 
on education. 
The Workshop made it clear that there are no 
magic and ready-made recipes for a renewed and 
strong Single Market. Nevertheless, one of the 
main outcomes of this Workshop was the need 
to create a new political appetite for the Single 
Market –as it was the case in the 1990s – and to 
move ahead towards an Economic Union 
(Europe has successfully completed its Monetary 
Union but failed to add the economic compo-
nent to the EMU). In a nutshell, the seminar’s 
overall outcome seemed to imply that Europe 
has still a long way to go to accomplish the ob-
jective of a “highly competitive social market 
economy” as set out in the Treaty on the func-
tioning of the European Union. 
